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# Content

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## *Articles*

## *In Conversation*

## *Book Reviews*

# Religion in the Art of Colonial Resistance:
## *Hinduism and the Struggle for Indian Sovereignty, 1870-1920*
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### *Abstract*

Drawing on material taken from the emergent Indian nationalist movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries this article analyses how Hinduism came to play a key role in the resistance to colonialism on the subcontinent. Tracing the discursive shifts in Indian critiques of colonialism that opened new spaces for Indian agency, it analyses how (modern) Hinduism inspired the development of Indian counter-conducts. These centred increasingly how Indians as individuals could overcome colonial subjugation by cultivating an authentically Hindu art of living to supplant the hegemony of the Western civilizational model undergirding the colonial order. Apart from providing a regime of action on the individual level, the article also shows how Hinduism inspired visions for a new, authentically Hindu civilizational telos, channeling individual counter-conducts into a collective mission to establish a new (post-colonial) order. Drawing on the Foucauldian conception of modern power as both totalising and individualising, the article argues that modern Hinduism was positioned to respond to colonial governmentality on both those levels and inspire alternatives to it. This made it a powerful resource for tactical interventions against the colonial state, as well as for inspiration for the construction of a post-colonial alternative. However, given the mutli-religious and multi-ethnic composition of the population on the Indian subcontinent the prominent role of Hinduism in filling the spaces of agency of the Indian colonial resistance was problematic. The article also points to the troublesome legacy of the religious dynamic of the post-colonial nation, particularly with regard to tendencies towards male supremacy and communal violence.

Keywords: India, Colonialism, Nationalism, Hinduism, Agency

Religion has played a strikingly prominent role in anti-colonial movements around the globe. What is it about religion specifically that makes it such a powerful force for colonial resistance and post-colonial transformation? This contribution will try to provide some insights into this question by examining the discursive

transformations in Indian critiques of colonialism between the late 19th and early 20th centuries – which became increasingly coloured by interventions inspired by what was claimed to be an Indian (Hindu) religious tradition. In the analysis that follows, I will discuss how and why religion came to be an important source of inspiration and locus of agency in the Indian anti-colonial movement, how it inspired tactics for challenging and resisting the colonial order as well as providing a charter for change in Indians' attempts to construct a post-colonial alternative.

Although this article deals with a very specific set of discourses embedded in the context of late19th- and early 20th-century Indian politics, it suggests tendencies in modern forms of religion more generally. Whether it be Hinduism, Islam or Christianity, religion has often served as a locus of agency in anti-colonial movements around the globe, from Latin America to Southeast Asia. That this is so makes sense in light of the fact that the discursive conditions of possibility for religiously inspired critiques of colonialism in India and elsewhere were to considerable extent structured by the hegemony of colonial governmental practices.[1] Anti-colonial movements emerging from similar discursive conditions of possibility hence evince similarities in their tactical interventions against the colonial order as well as in their attempts to construct post-colonial alternatives. In this regard, the Indian material discussed here is suggestive of fundamental structures of agency common to other anti- and post-colonial movements elsewhere.

Hence, I would assert that religion in the 19th century came to be entangled in political struggles over the direction of change and reform and the needs of human subjects that such reforms must address. The fact that rational government in India, and in other parts of the British empire, went hand in hand not only with economic exploitation but also with political subjugation made religion, as that realm perceived as wholly other to colonial state and society, the inspiration for an alternative order that was an important part of the chiseling away of colonial hegemony, not only at a societal, but also at an individual level. As I will discuss below, it is precisely

this linking of socio-political struggles at the collective level to the realm of individual action and subject formation that made it such a powerful resource in the Indian struggle for sovereignty. Thus, the aim of this contribution is to analyse how religion came to play an important role in the development of colonial counter-conducts[2] that were to disentangle subjects from the grip of colonial hegemony.

The first section of this article outlines how Indian elites came to problematize India's situation under colonial rule and how they conceptualised the macrodynamic of their subordination.[3] The second section goes on to examine how these conceptualisations opened a space for Indian political agency that allowed for the development of counter-conducts as well as the emergence of visions for a post-colonial order. The analysis of the power of religion, how it functioned to erode British dominance and provided the anti-colonial movement in India with new spaces of agency is the focus of the third section. However, any discussion of religion as a force in anti-colonial struggles would not be complete without discussion of its problematic role in establishing new states of domination. Hence, the fourth section will focus on two problematic legacies of the religious dynamics of the Indian anti-colonial movement, particularly with regard to tendencies towards male supremacy and communalism. In the conclusion I will discuss how religion's power to open spaces of agency is linked to the production of new forms of injustice and violence, a capacity that haunts India and other post-colonial nation-states to the present day.

## *The poverty of India and the betrayal of taste: conceptualizing the macrodynamic of colonial subjugation and creating spaces of Indian agency*

In the second half of the 19th century a series of events – among them the 1857 Mutiny, several catastrophic famines between 1850 and 1902, the 1879 repeal of import duties that gave some measure of protection to the Indian domestic textile industry,[4] and the 1896 import duties placed on Indian cloth sold in Britain[5] – seriously called into question the capacity of the British colonial government's

policies to achieve the "moral and material improvement" on the subcontinent that had been promised to Indian subjects.[6] This promise had been the cornerstone of the legitimacy of the imperial project since the public outcries against the "scandals of empire" in the late 18th century had necessitated an overhaul of the British imperial system.[7] The continued lack of such moral and material improvement, despite almost half a century of colonial rule, eroded that legitimacy and raised distrust, particularly among Indian subjects, of the intentions of the British administration. This led Indian intellectuals to engage in a sustained analysis of the causes of the "poverty of India".[8] At the same time, in the spirit of Victorian self-help, this engagement entailed the formulation of initiatives by which Indians themselves might counteract the deleterious effects of British policy.

Particularly during the latter third of the 19th century, these initiatives focused on resisting free trade and the international division of labour through which Britain had integrated the sub-continent into its empire. The nature of this integration had brought about a relationship to India that allowed British industry to profit from Indian resources. Indian critics theorised this relationship by imagining it in terms of a "material and moral drain" imposed by Britain to extract India's very lifeblood, leaving behind an impoverished and "rusticated" people whose power, intelligence and self-dependence had been stifled, while British industry had been strengthened by the very wealth it had extracted.[9] The solution to India's ills was therefore wholly dependent on rectifying this unhealthy relationship by putting a stop to the drain.[10] That meant reversing the developments resulting from the "free-trade" imperialism by which India had been incorporated into the British Empire. Ultimately, solving the problem of poverty rested upon Indians somehow regaining sovereignty over the subcontinent's commercial order.

Although Indians were not politically in a position to revive their domestic productive capacities by rapidly establishing factories to supply their daily needs and closing off economic borders to prevent the entry of British goods into Indian territory, they certainly could

control whether British goods were actually purchased.[11] As one anonymous Indian activist-commentator noted in the 1870s:

> The people most untrue to their nation and who are the great abettors in the falling off of their national manufactures, are the Princes, Zamindars, Baboos, and men of our principle towns and cities.… It is more toadyism and infatuity than a desire for cheapness and excellence, in which we should seek for the true cause of this conduct.… No apology for their infidelity can be found in the refinement of their taste, when its indulgence costs the country the ruin of its best interests.[12]

Hence, although British policy had made the drain possible, Indians themselves were at least as much to blame. Their *taste* for foreign goods was the ultimate cause for the decline of Indian manufacturing that had reduced the subcontinent into a supplier of cheap raw materials and agricultural produce for British industry and turned it into a market for more expensive manufactured goods from Lancaster or Manchester. The betrayal of taste was therefore a double betrayal. It amounted to solidarity with the British—in the sense that it lent them material support through commercial patronage—and it amounted to a repudiation of fellow Indians—in so far as they were denied their means of livelihood and consequently condemned to a life of poverty. What made the Indian betrayal all the worse, was that British goods were not even purchased out of "economic necessity" (because they were cheaper or of better quality), but out of "toadyism and infatuity", i.e. simply out of the desire to imitate the lifestyle of the British colonial elite and to display "refinement". The betrayal of taste thus became a synecdoche highlighting Indians' culpability in the weakening and subordination of their own people. By equating a taste for and the consumption of British goods with active sympathy for precisely those who were the cause of India's plight, the discourse highlights the direct link between a particular ("Western") lifestyle and colonial subjugation.

However, the betrayal of taste was not only posited to be directly responsible for the economic demise of a once vibrant local manufacturing sector and the transformation of India into an impoverished agricultural state. Ultimately, it also resulted in cultural-civilizational decline.[13] For one, the consumption of foreign goods was said to send a clear message that "... we do not love India; we love suburban England, we love the comfortable bourgeois prosperity that is to be some day established when we have learned enough science and forgotten enough art to successfully compete with Europe in a commercial war conducted on its present lines".[14] The taste for foreign goods and the corresponding lifestyle also entailed embracing the commercial and materialistic values it embodied. The betrayal of taste therefore amounted to the betrayal of one's own culture and values. Moreover, critics also pointed out that by imitating a foreign way of life, one was living a "parasitic" existence, dependent on imported British and other foreign goods and cultural tutelage. Hence, the cultural passivity and loss of civilizational agency that a lifestyle oriented to imitate European/British culture entailed only compounded the subcontinent's political subordination to colonial rule.

Yet, as tragic as the purported decline of India's political, material and cultural circumstances may have been, the true tragedy that had befallen India lay in the degradation of its moral and spiritual situation:

> Look round about you at the vulgarisation of modern India—our prostitution of art to the tourist trade—our use of kerosene tins for water jars, and galvanised zinc for tiles—our caricature of European dress—our homes furnished and ornamented in the style proverbial seaside lodging houses, with cut glass chandeliers and China dogs and artificial flowers—our devotion to the harmonium and the gramophone—these things are the outward and damning proof of 'some mighty evil in our souls.'[15]

As this quotation shows, the desire for the trappings of Western material culture thus also comes to be regarded as symptomatic of spiritual degradation. Taste is thus more than the merely utilitarian preference for some things over others: it is a commitment, grounded in sentiment ("devotion"), to the values of particular way of life, an art of living, an aesthetics of existence: "The modern amongst us can already tolerate an environment of cheap hideousness and tawdry, expensive discomfort, which would have disgusted the poorest in the days of Hindu or Mughal civilisation."[16]

The betrayal of taste, thus, highlighted several facets of the colonial condition. Conceived in terms of the more immediate consequences of the decline in consumption of domestically made goods and the increased consumption of imports from Europe, and England in particular, it drew attention to the material link between Britain's economic dominance, the political subjugation of India and the decline of Indian manufacturing, and hence the political economy of purchasing decisions and lifestyle. Conceived as a cultural phenomenon, the betrayal of taste brought to the fore the subtleties of the cultural economy of colonial hegemony, how goods were carriers of the culture from whence they originated and how their use went hand in hand with the adoption of the corresponding lifestyle, and an entire system of values. India was therefore not only being drained of its material resources, but also of its cultural autonomy and spiritual integrity. This placed Indians not only in a position of political subordination, but of cultural subordination as well, which internalised and naturalised colonial dominance in particularly subtle and hard-to-overcome ways. This problematized the moral and spiritual dimensions of what was lost when Indians succumbed to the seduction of modern, factory-made goods from England and Europe. To the extent that this touches on issues of political sovereignty and individual agency, it overlaps with concerns over how the colonial economic order undermined India's autonomy politically, culturally, spiritually and morally.

## *From the betrayal of taste to the Hindu art of living: Religion and the reclaiming of Indian sovereignty*

By problematizing the poverty of India in terms of a betrayal of taste, the mechanisms of Indian subordination were rendered in the hands of Indians themselves. Whereas, as we saw above, other conceptualisations of India's poverty localised its causes in British policy and administrative practices, meaning that amelioration could only be achieved through the colonial government and that Indians had little means of intervention other than to plead for policy improvements, casting the problem as one of a betrayal of taste opened a space for Indian agency. By shifting the focus away from the failings of colonial government towards production and consumption practices, Indians opened new spaces of intervention. Important counter-conducts to emerge from this particular way of problematizing Indian subjugation included not only the replacement of English-made with Indian-made equivalents by promoting domestic manufacturing of daily necessities, [17] but to also once again "create taste for native things".[18] Thus arose a discourse on the inherent beauty and purity of home-produced, or *swadeshi*, goods. Only with the cultivation of a new sense of taste that could appreciate the higher virtues of these goods would the effort succeed to get Indians (particularly elites) to furnish their homes with Indian furniture, wear Indian clothes and replace all other items of daily use with Indian alternatives.[19]

However, the problem actually went deeper than the definition of "authentically Indian" consumption practices, as Ananda K. Coomaraswamy (1877-1947) put it most eloquently when he wrote:

> ... by concentration on the purely material side of the question, but not recognizing the superior workmanship of hand-made and individually designed materials, it has come about that instead of attempting to restore the village weaver and the handloom, we are willing to waste the vital forces of the nation in child-labour and long hours of work under mechanical and

unhealthy conditions, transferred from Manchester to India. Remember that it can be said of England that "There is collected a population in our great towns which equals in amount the whole of those who lived in England and Wales six centuries ago; but whose condition is more destitute, whose homes are more squalid, whose means are more uncertain, whose prospects are more hopeless than those of the poorest serf of the middle ages and the meanest drudges of the medieval cities." Remember that one-tenth of the English people die in the work-house, the gaol or the lunatic asylum. Therefore learn not to waste the vital forces of the nation in a temporary political conflict, but understand that art will enable you to re-establish all your arts and industries on a surer basis, a basis which will bring well-being to the people themselves; for no lovely thing can be produced in conditions that are themselves unlovely.[20]

What was at stake, was not simply the immediate stoppage and reversal of the material drain on India through the shifting of consumption practices, but a more *fundamental* set of issues as to what type of socio-economic order should prevail on the subcontinent. Was the pursuit of factory production in India really the right path to progress?[21] The alternative to simply "transferr[ing] Manchester to India" was to focus on the mode of production that came to be seen as wholly other to industrial capitalism and indigenous to the Indian subcontinent: village production. It is in the ensuing discussions of how India's villages provided an indigenous model for the nation's future that the particular importance of Hinduism to this village order and to the reshaping of India along authentically Indian lines was highlighted, as we shall see in the following.

In 1916, only a few years after Coomaraswamy published his essays on handicrafts and *swadeshi* production from which was quoted above, the Indian sociologist and economist Radhakamal Mukerjee (1889-1968) proposed his own vision for bringing moral and material

improvement to the subcontinent in his *Foundations of Indian Economics*. Like Coomaraswamy, he was critical of the consequences of self-interested individualism, urbanisation and industrialisation that the implementation of policies based on modern (Western) economic thinking had brought about in India. In his view, the task of science was to find a set of alternative social and economic principles that would provide a more fitting foundation for Indian society.[22] Citing figures he obtained from the *Imperial Gazetteer,* he concluded that overwhelming majority of Indians still lived in villages and that "the self-sufficing isolated village is still the real unit of Indian social life."[23] Echoing a century-old Orientalist trope that located authentic India in its countless "village republics",[24] Mukerjee characterised India as an essentially village society and therefore argued that one must look to "the Indian village" to find an economic system that would be better suited "to the socio-economic traditions of the country, and to its geographical and historical conditions."[25]

Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Bengali villages, as well as on his on-going involvement with villagers in the context of his adult education programs,[26] Mukerjee presents "the economic message of India breathed forth by her immemorial institutions" (1916: xxi) embodied in the central pillars of village life: the joint-family as the primary economic unit (*Jati*), caste (which he refers to as *Samaj*), the village council (*Panchayat*) and Hinduism. Together, these pillars, according to Mukerjee, uphold a socio-economic order that fosters the ideal of "plain-living and high-thinking, by the religious respect for the virtues of poverty and self-denial" (ibid.: 466). The following quotation perhaps gives the best indication of what his vision looked like:

> There is the small plot of land where the vegetables of the season are grown, the women of the house nurturing them at their leisure. There will be two or three looms … The boys and girls in the weaver's cottage help their father by manipulating the strings and arranging the threads automatically, while he is weaving. The women manage the household and

spend their leisure profitably. They work in the vegetable garden, feed the cattle or poultry, make cowdung, spin cotton, or weave baskets. Homes are beautified by the handiwork of the family and popular art is encouraged. Life is strong, beautiful, and noble. Work is a pleasure, a joy. Industry is thus united to art and ethics…[27]

At the heart of this idyllic order is a Hindu ethos, which suffuses all the other components of village society and without which it would not function. "In India", Mukerjee notes, "the whole of life is regarded as religious, no part as profane."[28] The centrality of religion to daily life ensures the maintenance of a strong connection with the Absolute, with the higher ideals of civilisation.[29]

Unlike in the West, in which the individual is the fundamental economic and social unit, in India, where the religious ethos instills the virtues of affection and self-control, self-sacrifice, mutual control and dependence, the joint family constitutes the basic socio-economic unit.[30] This fosters a society that is driven not by "the individual's own scale of wants, his standard of comforts and of activities which regulates the growth of population", as is the case in the West, but rather a society governed by sentiments that foster a "family mode of enjoyment or standard of life."[31] This centers on the ties of obligation that prioritise the care for and support of weaker family members as well as the transmitting of the family estate and the maintenance of the integrity of the family.[32] The heroes of the great Hindu myths, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* are said to serve as exemplars of this ethos.[33] The socio-economic impact of this religiously grounded ethos is a high standard of morality and real contentment, but only as long as the religious ideal continues to be honoured.[34]

Hinduism, Mukerjee continues, has further impacts on the day-to-day activities of Indians. He writes, "In this conception of all life as sacrament, the product of the idealism of the Hindus and of their religion, the opportunity for art and craft is very great."[35] Implicitly, Mukerjee is arguing that the foundational rationality by which

Indian society operates (and ought to operate) is not grounded in instrumental reason that privileges material accumulation, as is the case in modern commercial societies. Instead, it is aesthetically and religiously expressive, emphasising a certain art of existence and value-rational ethos, rather than any particular set of technocratic material ends. Without the strictures of the desire for material accumulation, the individual enjoys a greater degree of freedom that allows for the realisation of his civilizational and individual potential. However, such an expressive, non-alienating approach to craft labour as an art of existence is possible only as long as an active religious (implicitly Hindu) life maintains man's connection with the Absolute, with his higher ideals. If this connection is lost, then labour is reduced to the meaningless reproduction of conventional forms in exchange for material sustenance.[36]

Mukerjee proposed his *Foundations of Indian Economics* not only as an alternative to prevailing tendencies in colonial policy and to the industrialist visions of leading nationalists in the Indian National Congress, but also so that it might serve as a model with lessons of universal validity from which Europe, too, could learn. As Mukerjee points out,

> The over-crowded, filthy cities, the depopulation of rural districts, the enormous disparity of wealth and the consequent conflicts of labour and capital, and chronic social interest (sic), which are the inevitable evils of the factory system, have in fact threatened the very foundations of Western society.
>
> [...]
>
> Thus Western society, in order to secure economic efficiency has forgotten its real end. Economic efficiency is required, for efficient production alone can give the leisure as well as satisfy the conditions of healthy and complete living. But it should always be remembered at the same time that economic efficiency is not the end of civilization. It is only a proximate end; and it should therefore work within the limits

of, and in subordination to, the governing end, which
is complete and healthy living, culture in the highest
sense of the term. [...] Wealth is not adequate to the
perfecting of culture: culture, as a recent writer puts
it, is the appreciation, not contemplative alone but
active and efficient, of the non-economic values. And
if the measure of a nation's true success is its culture
and higher life, the amount it has contributed to the
truth, the moral energy and intellectual happiness,
the spiritual hope and consolation of mankind, the
West cannot face this just criterion boldly.[37]

In face of such dislocations, even Western thinkers, Mukerjee
points out, have come to realise that their economic organisation
is essentially faulty, as the numerous movements for reform that he
refers to frequently in his text – socialism, the co-operative movement,
the arts and crafts movement and the movement for profit sharing
and co-partnership – make palpably clear.[38]

Mukerjee therefore presents the "ethics of Indian industrialism", as
he calls it, not only to address the moral and material drain in India,
but also the fundamental failings of urban industrial capitalism as a
civilizational form. The Indian socio-economic order, circumscribed
by caste, extended family, artisanal production and Hinduism, is
instead characterised by an "ennobling idealism" that is governed by
a devotion to the Divine and the Absolute, and thereby provides,
as discussed above, a space for the achievement and expression of
genius and inspiration.[39] This orientation instills in Indian society a
"profound respect for Personality, for the Spirit, for the Life eternal";
and "[s]uch a fair fabric of society with its ideal as the realization of
God-in-man for every individual cannot wholly be shattered by the
collision and shock of the forces of mechanism and monetarism that
have fast grown in strength, and are now in evident conflict in the
Western world."[40]

Mukerjee's vision of India's proper path to moral and material
improvement thus posits a socio-economic order that is wholly

other and also superior to the urban industrialism regarded as the culmination of Western civilisation. In the conventional framework of political economy, progress was conceived as the continuous material improvement of ever greater proportions of the population – to be realised by technical advancement and labour specialisation – and moral improvement was presumed to follow automatically from greater material prosperity. Mukerjee counters that the production of wealth need not and should not be the primary end of progress. Instead, this should be defined as the production of higher, immaterial values like contentment, community and self-realisation. The utopian impetus of a Hindu "Devotion to the Absolute" shifts the focus of human endeavours to loftier aims that push actors beyond the facticity of the status quo. It places the emphasis on the realisation of beauty and virtue through creative practices, whether this be in the production of goods for daily life (the economy), or in the maintenance of social relations (society), or in the cultivation of the self (ethics). Man's religious devotion thus is presented as the fountainhead of his self-actualising, emancipatory potential. It is the sacred spark of freedom that liberates him from subjugation to the materialist ends of the technocratic modern order and constitutes him as a truly autonomous subject.[41]

## *The dynamics of religion in resisting and overcoming colonialism: Hinduism and Indian political agency*

The civilisational reversal of roles achieved in Mukerjee's text is exemplary of the kind of positive revaluation of Indian culture that was taking place by the early 20th century. Rather than it being equated with irrationality and backwardness, it was now being held up as a model far superior to Western civilisation that had the potential to provide guidance for an alternative socio-economic order.[42] This relativized British claims to civilizational authority that justified the exercise of colonial tutelage and allowed Indians to reassert their historical agency and restore Indian sovereignty over not just its economy but also its society and culture. Such a redefinition of India's place in the world was key to being able to overcome the "politics of mendicancy"[43] that had in the latter half of the 19th

century characterised Indian elites' attempts to shift British colonial policy in a direction that was more in line with what they saw as India's interests. Here, Indians, in a subordinate role both culturally and politically, had to take up tactical positions within colonial discourse whereby they could only address the contradictions of colonial government – the contradictions between the promise of moral and material improvement and the delivery of it – and plead to the Raj to live up to that promise. The appreciation for India's civilizational achievements, particularly vis-à-vis the West, on the other hand, gave Indians a position from which to break out of that discursive framework to voice fundamental critiques of the colonial order and the claims of Western supremacy on which that was based. This relativized the claims of Western/British superiority in which colonial tutelage was grounded, opening discursive space for Indian elites to make demands for more power to reorient the government of affairs on the subcontinent. Formulating Hindu counter-orders, as Mukerjee (and others) did, helped set out a charter for such a reorientation.

Hence, the discursive move among Indian intellectuals like Mukerjee, to posit a purportedly ancient Hindu order as an alternative wholly other to modern Western civilisation created a discursive space to imagine civilizational possibilities outside what were purported to be the technocratic inevitabilities of the colonial order. While the latter was justified by materialist, means-ends rationality of "natural" laws, such as those of economics, the former, by virtue of its explicitly religious groundings, pushed beyond the base necessities of the material order by orienting itself towards "higher ideals" and "the Absolute". As the texts by Mukerjee and Coomaraswamy cited above show, religion's specific concern with "ultimacy and transcendence" that provides "norms and powers for the rest of life" is what allows it to constitute a discursive resource in critiques of modern (Western and colonial) reason.[44] The recurring emphasis of Indian critiques of colonial modernity – and Western civilisation in general – on spirituality versus material interests, on the expression of civilizational values and aesthetics rather than functional efficiency, and on transcendence rather than simple

acceptance of the facticity of a society's material reality, is rooted in a mode of problematization that emphasises concerns with ultimacy and transcendence that are specific to religion. At the same time, religion's specific claim to absolute validity beyond and outside rational argument or scientific evidence made it (and makes it) a politically powerful mode of discourse, an alternate "regime of truth", to counter modern governmentality.[45] Moreover, Hinduism's status as a religion particularly authentic to the Indian subcontinent, which is further discussed below, added to its tactical potency as a normative source.

At the same time, the concern with Indian sovereignty encompassed not only a preoccupation with collective socio-cultural sovereignty embodied in the power to define the policies shaping an Indian totality circumscribed by social structure and mode of production. It also extended to a concern with the sovereignty of the individual Indian over himself, cast in terms of the importance of living a spiritually and culturally emancipated, "authentically" Indian life. The problematization of Indian consumption habits and the discourse about the need to cultivate a taste for Indian things highlighted how individual lifestyles and consumption choices had contributed to India's subordination to colonial rule. And while government policy was firmly in the hands of the British administration, Indians found they could subvert the colonial order at the level of the individual subject. Religion thus provided an alternative system of capillary power that allowed Indians to begin to formulate interventions against the colonial regime that did not require access to or participation in state institutions. Counter-conducts like pledges to purchase only swadeshi goods and to shun foreign ones came to take on particular force and momentum due in no small measure to their religious anchoring.[46] This opened new spaces of political agency, allowing Indian activists to mobilise the Indian population against the colonial regime and its institutions. Religion thus served as both a charter for and conduit of counter-conducts to erode colonial domination.

Yet, at this point it is important to note two things. First, the religious "tradition" to which Indian intellectuals like Coomaraswamy and

Mukerjee referred in their texts was not a legacy passed down from time immemorial, as many Indians including Mukerjee claimed, but a product of colonial governance, in which Britons and Indians had systematised and rationalised a plethora of South Asian religious practices and forms of knowledge to produce modern Hinduism.[47] Second, the positive revaluations of that tradition were more than mere atavism or nativist inversions of colonial discourse. The Indian critique of colonial domination dovetailed with and was in part directly addressed to a broader critique of civilisation that had been transpiring in Europe and North America since at least the beginning of the 19th century. In Britain, and, by extension, the British empire, the writings of those such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, William Morris and Leo Tolstoy were formative of this civilizational critique.[48] Not only did these writers problematize the consequences of urban industrial capitalism bore socially and spiritually, questioning whether it would in fact bring greater well-being to all, they also raised the more fundamental question as to whether the contemporary social order was not too materialistic and "mechanical" to satisfy the needs of the human condition. In this regard, Indian elites and Britons were grappling with similar concerns over how urban industrialism reduced the human condition to materialist utilitarian ends, leaving no room for "higher ideals" or the cultivation of a relationship to a transcendental authority, be this Nature, God or some more abstractly conceived "Absolute". This made up the common ground between Indian elites critical of the colonial order and Britons and other Europeans sceptical of the Western model of civilisation on which Indian critiques of British rule and the concomitant counter-conducts were received in the colonial public sphere.

For Indians, however, the background of such efforts at "re-orientation" of the Indian people, such as those exerted by Coomaraswamy and Mukerjee discussed above, also entailed the desire to undo the "civilising" projects that had been undertaken since the first third of the 19th century to, as Thomas Babington Macaulay put it in his famous note on Indian education, form "a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and

in intellect."[49] James FitzJames Stephens' remarks, made some fifty years later, on the aims of colonial government make tellingly clear that such efforts were not limited to the education of an elite class of Indian colonial middlemen but included "the establishment of a system of law which regulates the most important parts of the daily life of the people constitutes in itself a moral conquest more striking, more durable, and far more solid, than the physical conquest which rendered it possible."[50] Here, the political ramifications of what might be regarded as a-political matters of individual everyday socio-cultural practices – such as literary or artistic expression, dress, habitus, social forms (or lifestyle), custom, the display of cultural or religious symbols, etc. – become apparent.

In the late 20th century scholars began to analyse how colonial subjugation was effected not only by brute military force and the power of ideology or argument, but also by the inculcation of "natives" into regimes of living designed to align their tastes, opinions, morals and intellect (to echo Macaulay) with those of their rulers, thus remaking them into colonial subjects.[51] Indian activists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Coomaraswamy and Mukerjee, were all too aware that the inculcation of the tastes and habitus of a Western lifestyle was subtly and intimately linked to their subordination. It fostered an admiration of, love for and desire of the civilizational accomplishments of England or Europe, overshadowing or completely negating one's own civilisation. The revitalisation of indigenous social and cultural forms in everyday life, grounded in a specifically Hindu ethic, therefore became an important focus of activism.[52] The concern with Indian sovereignty encompassed not only a preoccupation with collective socio-cultural sovereignty, embodied in the power to define the policies shaping the social structure and mode of production, but extended to a concern with the sovereignty of the individual Indian over himself, cast in terms of the importance of living an authentically Indian life, a life implicitly or explicitly regarded as grounded in Hinduism.

Hence, religion and religious practices were an important locus of inspiration in this project of civilizational re-orientation that targeted

an Indian collective and the individual Indian subject. As Kenneth William Jones has pointed out, since before the arrival of Western ideologies to India in the early 20th century, "exponents of social or cultural reform drew on religious authority for the legitimization of change."[53] There was thus an already established set of discursive practices that deployed religion in the renegotiation of the social order. Moreover, since the voyages of discoveries' earliest encounters with non-Europeans, it had in European discourse been regarded as a key axis of difference. Hence, for example, 18th-century attempts by East India Company officials to understand the workings of Indian society in view of promoting trade and commerce focused on "Hindoo law." Governmental practices like the legal pluralism by which the British Raj made legal rulings depending on membership in a religious or ethnic community, or the taking of censuses further shaped, cemented the importance of and reified the boundaries of religious identity.[54] Thus both Indians and Europeans accorded religion, as the strongest and highest norm-setting authority, a central role in the constitution of a social order.

Yet, being Hindu in particular came to take on a special valuation. Whereas Islam had been the religion of the Mughal conquerors, and was therefore seen by colonial government as essentially alien to the subcontinent, a view consciously or unconsciously internalised by many (Hindu) educated Indian elites, Christianity was seen as a colonial import to the subcontinent, and the religious practices of tribal peoples were seen as too low down the civilizational scale to even be given consideration, Hinduism could lay claims to being historically endogenous as well as associated with a culturally advanced civilisation arguably on par with the Christian West.[55] As such it could claim a privileged role in defining a social order and concomitant practices that reflected an authentic Indian way of being.

With regard to the role it played in defining a social collectivity as well as cultivating particular kinds of individuals, modern Hinduism, as it emerged in the course of the 19th century, evinces parallels with the capacity of Christian pastoral power to both totalise and

individualise, a capacity that made possible modern forms of governmentality.[56] As Peter van der Veer has pointed out, in Britain, religion played an important role in the emergence of the modern British nation-state, becoming nationalised and constituting a key field of disciplinary practice in which the modern civil subject was produced. Although the British colonial government in India took great pains to avoid positioning itself religiously, religion ended up playing a disciplinary role in colonial governance, too, both in producing upstanding civil servants as well as orderly colonial subjects.[57] Indian elites like Coomaraswamy and Mukerjee, or even more prominently activists like Swami Vivekananda or Dayananda Saraswati, engaged Hindu difference and turned it from an axis of colonial subordination into a framework of norms, values and practices. This framework circumscribed an ethos, or a distinct art of living implicitly contrastive of Europe's Protestant ethic, that would constitute authentically Indian subjects, reclaimed from the culturally alienating and subordinating disciplinary practices of colonial governmentality. Hence, much as British elites had made Christianity central to the formation of a characteristically British habitus and national ethos, Indian intellectuals turned to Hinduism to cultivate de-colonised, sovereign Indian subjects.

But like with Christianity in Britain, Hinduism also functioned in a totalising capacity to produce an Indian collectivity. We have seen, particularly in the 'betrayal of taste' discourse, how religion became connected to discussions of collective identity and the constitution of the group as not only a socio-cultural collective with a shared history of colonial subjugation and a shared set of norms and values, but also a moral community and a community of sentiment.[58] The shared history of both material and moral decline produced a collective sense of betrayal and injustice and a shared sense of loss. At the same time, ideas of a Hindu utopia to be achieved through individuals' return to an authentically Hindu way of life provided a shared set of values and vision of the future as well as a sense of mission regarding what the counter-conducts resisting colonial subjugation were to achieve. Texts like Mukerjee's formulate such a vision and are expressive of this shared sense of mission. His portrayal of a Hindu

utopia as the telos to Indian efforts to reclaim their sovereignty as a people and a civilisation embeds individual counter-conducts in a larger, collective mission of moral, spiritual and material salvation and lends it normative force.

The normative grounding of Hindu order in the realm of the sacred and transcendental is also significant, as it serves to trump the more mundane foundations of the colonial technocratic order in the scientific principles of political economy. The focus on the (re)assertion of civilizational autonomy through the definition of a distinct telos for Indian civilisation in contradistinction to that of the West is what made the absolutizing aspect of religion so important to imparting political agency to Indians vis-à-vis the colonial state. Religion, in its totalising and individualising capacity, thus provided inspiration for developing purportedly morally superior, transcendentally valid and authentically Indian alternatives to the governmentality of the colonial state, which allowed Indians to experiment with and develop new forms political organisation, social integration, new types of subjecthood and, ultimately, alternative forms of governmentality.

## Coda: Hinduism and the Production of New States of Domination

While the primary objective of this contribution has been to discuss how religion in India, and in colonial contexts more generally, has served to open new spaces of political agency and to inspire new social and political forms of being, I must at least mention some of the darker consequences of religiously inspired interventions in the political order. Although India ultimately won its emancipation through an anti-colonial struggle in which Hinduism did in fact come to play a very prominent role, this entailed the production of new states of domination that haunt the post-colonial state to the present day. While in the ensuing decades after the 1916 publication of Radhakamal Mukerjee's *Foundations of Indian Economics* Hinduism would prove to be an effective means of finally extending the resistance to the injustices of colonialism beyond educated elites to include the masses, particularly under the leadership of those such

as Bal Gangadhar (Lokmanya) Tilak, Lala Lajpat Bal, Bipin Chandra Pal, Sri Aurobindo and Barindra Ghose or Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi. However, in its modern manifestation, Hinduism had become a field of disciplining and normalising practices that not only created a collectivity and imparted its members with political agency, but also excluded those who could not conform or could by definition not belong to a Hindu collectivity as envisioned by nationalist intellectuals.[59]

Despite Gandhi's prominent attempts at reconciliation and promoting brotherly ties between non-Hindu and Hindu Indians, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs were now defined as exterior to an India increasingly seen as essentially Hindu. These efforts to build bridges to other religious communities only highlighted their outsider status. And the fact that religious membership was so key to the definition of the emergent Indian nation as not simply a political community of interests joined by the desire to overcome colonial exploitation, but as a moral community defined by Hindu values, beliefs and practices, left those outside that moral community subject to the wrath of the self-righteous.[60] The grounding of these values, beliefs and practices in ideas of the sacred, and in what was regarded as the transcendent authority of religious texts and practices, set them outside the sphere of rational debate, locating them instead in the realm of devotion and fervent belief.[61]

The recurring problem of communal violence and religious intolerance in South Asia is the legacy of defining Indian-ness as Hindu authenticity and embedding the quest for Indian sovereignty in a narrative of Hindu civilizational restoration. In such a narrative, cultural practices that do not fall in line with the norms of what is considered to be orthodox Hinduism are regarded as threats to the social body and the moral integrity of the nation. And, non-Hindus, by virtue of their religious non-membership, cannot claim the same sort of national belonging or moral status as Hindus and hence are faced with the precariousness of being treated as second class citizens or even as threats to the national (moral and spiritual) order.[62]

Religion's claims to transcendence and absolute validity, which make it such a powerful mode of intervention against a political status quo, can be difficult to reconcile with a tolerance for different modes of being rooted in other religions or cultures. For India, and other post-colonial states, this legacy of efforts to impart the nation sacred, religious grounding that would trump more mundane colonial claims to the scientific, technocratic legitimacy of their rule, has proven problematic for ethnic and religious minorities, who by definition are excluded from both the national as well as the moral community. The problem of communal violence attests to this darker side of the religious foundations of an Indian post-colonial nation.[63]

As the excerpt quoted above that highlighted Mukerjee's vision of an authentically Indian (Hindu) village order suggested, women have also suffered the consequences of a religiously defined post-colonial order. Unlike Muslims, Sikhs and other ethnic or religious minorities, they were included in the Hindu narrative of civilizational autonomy, but primarily in their role as devoted wives, nurturing mothers and guardians of the home as the sacred space of tradition.[64] Mukerjee's poetic description of village women nurturing their gardens and managing as well as beautifying the home as central elements of a "noble", authentically Hindu life, is indicative of the centrality of patriarchy in the definition of an authentically Indian civilisation.

Again, one must caution that the idealised gender order was the outcome not of timeless religious tradition, but of discursive tactics to position Indian civilisation favourably in comparison to the West.[65] The women's movement in the early 20th century did not go unnoticed in India, and the socio-political upheavals that resulted in Britain and other parts of Europe and North America when women began to enter the workforce as professionals and demand equal rights to men, were seen by conservative Indian intellectuals, such as Mukerjee, as just yet one more indication of the unraveling of Western civilisation. Hindu civilisation, being all that Western civilisation was not, therefore had to be immune to such dislocations. Hence, the emphasis on how it upheld women's "natural" roles as wives and mothers, keeping them from the corruptive influences of the public sphere and labour market.[66]

This legacy, too, weighs heavily on the post-colonial state.[67] As women have taken advantage of opportunities in education, entered the workforce as professionals and taken up the habitus and lifestyle of "the modern woman", refusing to be confined to house and hearth, the backlash to uphold a patriarchal national order has been violent. Despite the specific emphasis of the Indian constitution on gender equality, numerous government acts that have made provisions to protect the rights of women in the workplace, the home, marriage, etc. as well as a representational quota in local government,[68] violence against women who do not submit to their "traditional" role is virulent: honour killings, rape, domestic violence, acid attacks and "insults to modesty" remind women that the letter of the law is no match for the weight of a patriarchal Hindu moral order that was made the foundation of the post-colonial nation.[69] Again, for those who ascribe to the idea of patriarchal national order grounded in what are popularly conceived as religious dictates, the gender order is non-negotiable; and any attempts to contest or resist it amount to a violation of sacred principles and pose not just a political but also a moral threat to the nation.

## Final Remarks

Religion has proven to be a powerful force in anti-colonial movements across the globe. By taking a closer look at the case of India and how religious discourse entered into what had previously been a critique of colonialism grounded in the scientific discourse of political economy, we have been able to gain a better understanding of the role it came to play in the mobilisation of anti-colonial resistance as well as the constitution of new subjects. The fact that religion was able to respond to colonial governmentality at both the individual and collective level made it uniquely suitable to being moulded into a native alternative. Its function, rooted in orientalism and colonial ethnography, as a marker of distinctiveness and authenticity made it an all the more appropriate in the eyes Indians who were becoming politically conscious of the subtle workings of the civilising mission that subordinated them not only politically but also culturally and spiritually. Hinduism served to re-orient them by providing a

collective vision as well as a guide to a specifically Indian art of living at the individual level. Particularly in the latter respect, Hinduism opened new spaces of agency and mobilisation that were yet unthought in late 19th-century critiques of colonial rule. While political economy had provided Indian intellectuals with the concepts to analyse and criticise the mechanisms of colonial subordination through free-trade imperialism, Hinduism provided inspiration for the formulation of counter-conducts – re-orienting consumption practices and lifestyles, redefining fundamental modes of sociability and production – as well as defining a distinctive telos towards which these counter-conducts were directed.

As a regime of truth that was rooted in belief and devotion rather than evidence and rational argument, religion proved to be a powerful contender to the scientific, technocratic justifications of colonial rule. Moreover, it's orientation towards the transcendent and absolute, rather than the mundane facticity of the empirical world, made for a more powerful vision of moral and material improvement than that promised to subjugated Indians by a regime of scientifically guided colonial government. The mundane "materialism" of the latter was contrasted with the morally uplifting and spiritually enriching potential of the former. Moreover, religion's claim to absolute validity and its promise of transcendence make it powerful grounding for resistance movements. At the same time, these strong truth claims, which are removed from rational argument and rest instead on belief and devotion, bear the potential to bring about new states of domination that are difficult to overcome for this very reason. The violence against women not conforming to Hindu ideals of femininity and against non-Hindu religious minorities attest to this darker legacy of religion's constitutive role in the formation of the post-colonial Indian nation. The claims of absolute validity and transcendence that are particular to religion, as well as the fact that it takes recourse to belief and devotion rather than evidence and rational argument, make it difficult to negotiate political visions that have been grounded in it. While this makes religion a powerful ally for resistance movements, once it becomes part of the foundations of a nation-state, its claims to transcendence and absolute validity

make those foundations rather too rigid and insufficiently porous. Moreover, by linking national belonging to the constitution of a religious community, it renders all those outside it second class citizens at best and existential threats to the nation at worst. In any event, colonial emancipation comes at the price of post-colonial states of domination.

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## Notes

1   Cf. Ghatak and Abel 2013.

2   Foucault develops the term counter-conducts out of dissatisfaction with more conventional terms like "resistance" or "dissidence", which are limited to the political field. Counter-conducts are actions directed against any regime of conduct, whether it is seen by actors as political or not. His examples include the refusal to accept medical knowledge and opting for other forms of healing, creating societies for the creation of a new man or new type of society. For more on counter-conducts, see Foucault 2007: 194-202. Foucault's concept of self-practice is developed within the context of his work on ethics and focuses on the work actors undertake on the self as part of their efforts to produce a good or beautiful life. See Foucault 2000b [1982], 2000c [1983] and 2000d [1984].

3   Foucault uses this term to denote his critical approach to politics, which is not to suggest better solutions to pressing issues, but rather to question the fundamental way in which issues are thought. The term problematisation is used to highlight "the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics" (Foucault 2000a [1984]: 114-115). The term is used here to highlight the way Indian elites developed domains of thoughts, acts and practices that posed problems for colonial government.

4   See Goswami 2004: 227-228; Chaudhary 1968: 277-307; and cf. Dutt 1956 [1906]: vol. 2, viii. f. and 517-519. This decision, however, was no political *novum*, but rather continued a policy, legitimised with reference to the principles of political economy and the imperatives of free trade, that privileged English manufacturing, particularly cotton manufacturing, interests over Indian economic and financial interests (cf. Harnetty 1962, 1965).

5   This finally confirmed to Indians of more moderate (pro-British) political leanings that English policy had little or nothing to do with Indian 'material and moral progress' and that it was governed wholly by British business interests. While Indian goods were slapped with export duties, cheap

British goods were imported freely and the policy justified by the dogma of the benefits of free trade. Cf. Chandra 1966: 129.

6    Among the most influential were the writings of the Indian economist and social reformer Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901). See, for example, Ranade 1990b [1892]: 280-303.

7    Cf. Dirks 2006.

8    Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), an early Indian political leader and Member of the British Parliament, was alongside Ranade among the most prominent of these intellectuals, speaking and publishing prolifically on India's poverty and how British rule had drained the country of its wealth (cf. Chandra 1966: chs. 1 and 13 and Dasgupta 1993: ch. 6).

9    On India's "rustication" under British colonialism, see Ranade 1990c [1893]: esp. 341.

10   Chandra 1966: 638. Initially, the national drain referred to the 'home charges' imposed by the British on India to pay for the cost of administration and the improvements (such as railways) made to the subcontinent. The protest centred largely on the fact that the colonial administration was spending money on British rule without consideration as to whether India had the revenue to pay for it. Many suspected that the services and improvements made had more to do with Britain's desire to promote its own businesses than India's needs. However, this specific notion of the drain was subsequently expanded by Indian intellectuals to include the general diminution of the means of subsistence of the general population (*ibid.*: 655-657). As the notion was further popularised by the Indian press, it came to stand for the general flow of wealth from India to Britain that was held up as the exclusive cause for the impoverishment of India, as well as the concomitant deleterious effect this had on India's economic dynamism (*ibid.*: 642f.). Scholarly elucidation of the material drain on India ("Drain Theory") is generally attributed to the work of Dadabhai Naoroji (1988 [1901]); also fn. 8 above; Cf. Sarkar 1973: 97, fn. 26). The Bengali economic historian Romesh Chunder Dutt provided the detailed historical and statistical corroboration of this theory in his two-volume *Economic History of India* (1956 [1901]).

11   Chandra 1966: 134-135 and Sarkar 1973: 96-97.

12   Bholonath Chandra *Mookerjee's Magazine* (1873), quoted in Chandra 1966: 125. C.A. Bayly's study of the "social life of things" in colonial society on the subcontinent contextualises criticisms such as this one within the framework of Indian ideas regarding the importance of material goods in the exercise of political power. Since both the quantity and variety of goods amassed by a ruler was understood by rivals to express the extent and productiveness of his dominions, as well as the degree of his influence beyond those dominions, European goods, especially luxuries and novelties, became highly prized acquisitions in the context of internecine jockeying for power amongst political rivals. European goods had thus become status

objects in a political contest over elite status fought by means of competitive consumption (1986: 302-306).

13    Cf. McGowan 2009: 73 ff.
14    Coomaraswamy 1994 [1911]: 3.
15    Idem., 3.
16    Idem., 14.
17    For example, Ranade 1990a [1890], 1990b [1892] and 1990c [1893]. For an overview of various industrial projects, see Sarkar 1973: 108-136. For a fuller discussion on Indian efforts to promote home industries see, Chandra 1966.
18    *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of 6. January 1876, quoted in Chandra 1966.: 125.
19    These efforts to promote the consumption of *swadeshi* goods entailed both positive encouragement as well as social pressure, negative sanctions and the use of force. Pamphlets, plays, songs and poems praised these goods and *swadeshi* emporia were opened to make them easily available to the public. Brahmins agreed not to use foreign goods in rituals. But coercion also played an important role, such as ostracism or the forceful shutting down of shops that continued to sell imported products (cf. Sarkar 1973: 252-335).
20    Coomaraswamy 1994 [1911]: 4-5.
21    McGowan 2009: 96-101. Cf. also Sarkar 1973: 105.
22    Mukerjee 1916: 446. Mukerjee's project was not entirely new. Mahadev Govind Ranade had already lectured on the need to reformulate the principles of political economy in light of the specifics of Indian society and culture (see Ranade 1990b [1892]). Many of the themes touched on by Ranade are taken up greater detail in Mukerjee's work.
23    Idem., 12.
24    On the emergence of the Orientalist trope of village India, see Dumont 1966, Dewey 1972, Katten 1999 and Inden 2000: ch. 4. For the central role it came to play in Indian nationalist ideology, see Jodhka 2002.
25    Mukerjee 1916: xix.
26    Cf. Joshi 1986: 1458.
27    Idem., 452.
28    Idem., 47.
29    cf. Idem., 51 f.
30    Idem., 15.
31    Idem., 15.
32    Idem., 16, 18.
33    Idem., 23.
34    Idem., 25.
35    Idem., 47.
36    Idem., 51.
37    Idem., 335 f.
38    Idem., 332, 337.

39    Idem., 455.

40    Idem., 459.

41    Idem., 455.

42    Although racist attitudes towards India and Indians continued to be commonplace, J.J. Clarke describes how by the end of the 19th century an there was a veritable "orientomania" among European (including British) upper and middle classes (1997:74). The change in attitude towards Indian culture and civilisation had much to do with the role these played in Romantic critiques of the Enlightenment, which continued to be relevant towards the end of the 19th century as the dislocations of urban industrial capitalism came to be regarded with serious concern (cf. Brantlinger 1996). Cf. Halbfass 1988: 68-83, 419-420 and Inden 2000: 66-74.

43    The term was coined by Indian activists like Lala Lajpat Rai, Aurobindo Ghosh and Bal Gangadhar Tilak who were critical of the Indian National Congress' moderate approach to colonial critique that focussed on reasoned argument directed at the British public to pressure colonial government towards policies more in line with Indian interests. Sarkar 1988: 96-100.

44    The quotations are taken from King 2005: 7695.

45    Foucault was particularly interested in the intimate connection between knowledge and power, how particular power relations and institutional structures conditioned the production and maintenance of "truth statements", particularly those truth statements labelled as scientific. For a useful overview of the progressive elaboration of the concept of "regimes of truth" from Foucault's early to later work, see Lorenzini 2015. Although Foucault never applied that concept to the analysis of religion, he was aware, and admired (perhaps naively), religion for its capacity to transform subjectivities and empower to revolution, most notably with regard to the force of Islam in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. See Foucault 1990[1979], cf. also Scullion 1995.

46    Cf. Sarkar 1973 250-330, Goswami 2004: ch. 6. Religion provided not only an alternative network of institutions and social ties along which resistance could be mobilised, it also provided established discursive tactics that pressure or move individuals to engage in counter-counducts because of moral or religious commitments.

47    Cf., for example, Appadurai 1988: 56-59.

48    On the Indian critique of colonial domination and how this was linked to wider critiques of Western civilisation, see; Fox 1989: ch. 6; McGowan 2009: ch. 2 and the references in note 21 above. On the influence of the writings of Coleridge, Carlyle, Ruskin, etc., see Brantlinger 1996 and Connell 2001.

49    Macaulay 1835.

50    Quoted in Metcalf 1995: 39.

51    Cf. Said 1994; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: chs. 5-7.

52    Cf. Sarkar 1992; Wakankar 1995; and Goswami 2004: 251-260.

53    Jones 1992:1.

54 On Hinduism as an key axis of difference in early encounters between Europeans and inhabitants of the subcontinent, see Halbfass 1988: ch. 3. On the importance that East India Company officials of the late 18th century accorded to understanding "native culture", including Hinduism, see Kopf 1969: esp. ch. 1. On the creation and reification of religious identities in India through colonial governmental practices, see for example Metcalf 1992: 231. On the impact this has had on contemporary India, see Randeria 2006.

55 This was due in no small part by the widespread reception of Friedrich Max Müller's work, which relocated European civilisational ancestry in the East, notably India. European civilisation was thus built on foundations set by "Classical Hinduism" or the "Vedic Golden Age". Cf. Kopf 1969: ch. 2. These ideas were picked up by Indian activists, such as Dayananda Saraswati and Swami Vivekananda, who popularised them among Indians seeking to disengage from the colonial cultural order (cf. van der Veer 1999: 30-38).

56 Peter van der Veer has made a similar point, 1999: 19.

57 Ibid.

58 Cf. Anderson 1983.

59 A case in point is the tensions that arose between higher and lower caste Hindus as well as Muslims during the Swadeshi movement, which certainly had a economic/class component, but also a religious one. See, for example, Sarkar 1973 and Goswami 2004.

60 Cf. van der Veer 1999 and Shani 2005.

61 Cf. Goswami 2004: chs. 5 and 6.

62 For further discussion of the thorny problems of citizenship in India in the context of religious and cultural pluralism, see Randeria 2006.

63 The literature on communalism in South Asia is extensive and cannot be discussed here. For discussions of the historical roots of communalism, see for example, Freitag 1989, van der Veer 1994, Ludden 1996, Jalal 1997, Shani 2005, Randeria 2006. Discussions of dynamics of communalism in contemporary history, see Hansen 1999, Ludden 2005 and Randeria 2006.

64 Cf, for example, Chatterjee 1992 68-72, 120-121.

65 On how "the woman question" in India was embroiled in globally circulating discourses and how (Western) bourgeois concepts of femininity entered into nationalist discourse, see Walsh 2004. Cf. also Ray 2000.

66 Cf. Mukerjee 1916: 19.

67 For a discussion of the transformations of patriarchy from the late colonial era to the founding of the colonial state, see Newbigin 2010.

68 For an overview of the constitutional provisions and laws concerning women's rights, see https://www.wikigender.org/wiki/indian-laws-relating-to-women-and-children/ (accessed 17. March 2018). The Women's Reservation Bill, which was to institute a quota for women in the Indian national parliament, was introduced in 1996 and passed by the upper house of the Indian parliament in 2010, despite stiff resistance. The lower house has

yet to decide on the bill. See https://www.wikigender.org/wiki/india-the-womens-reservation-bill/ (accessed 17. March 2018). More on the current status of the bill, see "Will Women's Reservation Bill be passed in Lok Sabha this winter session?", *The Indian Express*, 17. December 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/womens-reservation-bill-winter-session-of-parliament-lok-sabha-4982388/ (accessed 24. December 2017).

69  National Crime Records Bureau 2015: ch. 5. See also the 2013 Council on Foreign Relations Report written by Beina Xu, "Governance in India: Women's Rights", https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/governance-india-womens-rights (accessed 17. March 2018).

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